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Abstract
Emerging market economy business cycles are typically characterized by high con-
sumption and output volatility, strongly counter-cyclical current accounts, and counter-
cyclical real interest rates. Evidence from the wider EME and less developed economy
business cycle experience suggests however that real interest rates can also be pro-
cyclical. We reconcile the pro-cyclicality of real interest rates with the above facts by
embedding scal policy into a standard emerging market business cycle model. We
show that scal policy makes real interest rates a-cyclical or pro-cyclical. We use the
model to replicate qualitatively some of the key features of the Indian business cycle.
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1 Introduction
Building dynamic stochastic general equilibrium (DSGE) models of emerging market economies
(EMEs) has become an important area of research in macroeconomics. A recent empirical
literature has identied key stylized facts in emerging market economy business cycles to
see how these di¤er from the main features of advanced economy (AE) business cycles (see
Agénor et al. (2000), Rand and Tarp (2002), Neumeyer and Perri (2005), Loayza et al.
(2007), Male (2010), and Ghate et al. (2013)). The key stylized facts that these papers have
identied are as follows. First, output in EMEs tends to be more volatile than output in
advanced economies.1 Second, EMEs have counter-cyclical real interest rates. In AEs, real
interest rates are typically a-cyclical or at the most mildly pro-cyclical. Third, consumption
is pro-cyclical and more volatile than output in EMEs; in AEs, consumption is pro-cyclical
but is less volatile than output. Fourth, net exports are much more counter-cyclical with
respect to output in EMEs in comparison to the AEs.
This research has motivated new theoretical models to understand the propagation and
amplication of shocks in EME business cycles. One branch of the literature builds upon
the seminal work of Neumeyer and Perri (2005).2 These authors build a small open econ-
omy (SOE) real business cycle (RBC) model with interest rate shocks and working capital
constraints.3 A higher interest rate implies that a rms borrowing costs to meet its working
capital constraint increases. This leads to a decline in the labor demanded by rms, and since
this is a full employment model, a reduction in labor demand leads to a reduction in output.
This channel makes real interest rates counter-cyclical. A crucial feature of this model is
that households have GHH preferences (see Greenwood et al. (1988)). GHH preferences shut
o¤ the income e¤ect, making labor supply invariant to the income e¤ects associated with
a positive interest rate shock (see Li (2011)). Consumption drops instantaneously and falls
more than output due to the inter-temporal substitution e¤ect from a rise in real interest
rates. At the same time private investments also fall since the demand for private capital falls
because of higher interest rates. As a result, net exports (dened as the savings-investment
1Male also (2010) estimates output to be on average twice as volatile in EMEs in comparison to AEs.
Rand and Tarp (2002) on the contrary state that output is no more than 20% more volatile in EMEs
compared to AEs.
2Recently, Tiryaki (2012) estimates Neumeyer and Perris (2005) model to replicate Turkeys business
cycle properties.
3More specically, in their model, rms face a working capital constraint, i.e., rms have to pay a fraction
of the wage bill before actual production takes place. In order to nance this working capital constraint,
rms issue corporate bonds to agents in international capital markets at a market determined interest rate
on bonds. The interest rate has two di¤erent components an international interest rate component and a
country spread component driven by a shock to the country spread risk with the latter varying according to
an individual countrys sovereign risk.
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gap) displays counter-cyclicality with respect to output.
Another branch of theoretical models of EME business cycles builds on the seminal work
of Aguiar and Gopinath (2007). These authors explain the key stylized facts of EME business
cycles discussed above by allowing for both permanent trend shocks and transitory changes
in productivity. Trend shocks a¤ect both current income and future income. They justify
this assumption by noting that emerging markets are characterized by a large number of
policy regime shifts, which can be viewed as shocks to the trend productivity growth rate.
Using the permanent income hypothesis as the identication mechanism, a shock to trend
productivity implies a boost to both current output and also future output. Since a shock
to the trend productivity increases permanent income, consumption increases more than
income. This reduces savings, and generates a counter-cyclical current account decit.
One aspect that is missing in the above theoretical literature is that there is no explicit role
for scal policy. This is puzzling since scal policy plays an important role in macroeconomic
stabilization in many developing countries and EMEs.4 For instance, Male (2010) nds that
government expenditures tend to be signicantly more volatile than output in EMEs and
more volatile than government expenditures in AEs. She also reports that there is no robust
stylized observation on the correlation between real government expenditure and output.5
In other evidence (see Talvi and Vegh (2005)), government expenditures have tended to
be more pro-cyclical in EMEs than in AEs although there are countries where government
expenditures are counter-cyclical.6 Our takeaway from this literature is that in some EMEs,
government expenditures are counter-cyclical with respect to output and in others it is pro-
cyclical.
Another aspect that has typically not received su¢ cient attention is the role of scal
policy for macroeconomic stabilization when an economy is hit with an interest rate shock.
For instance, Male (2010) nds that a typical feature of these EMEs is that both government
expenditures and real interest rates are more volatile than output. The contemporaneous
4Fiscal policy can serve as a stabilizing instrument if government expenditures are counter-cyclical along
with pro-cyclicality of government revenues. One explanation for pro-cyclical government expenditure in
EMEs is that governments often face political pressures or temptations to avoid budgetary surpluses during
boom-time thereby constraining themselves from lowering expenditures or raising taxes. During recessions,
governments in EMEs are forced to reduce spending because of lack of access to credit (see Talvi and Vegh
(2005)). In the post great nancial crisis period, there is also a renewed interest in scal policy in small open
economies.
5Agénor et al. (2000) state that government expenditures tend to be more counter-cyclical in AEs as
compared to EMEs.
6This is at odds with a volumnious literature that has found that scal policies are pre-dominantly pro-
cyclical in EMEs (Talvi and Vegh (2005), Cuadra el al. (2010)). Over the last decade, however, several
EMEs have "graduated" from having pro-cyclical scal policy to having counter-cyclical scal policy. This
"graduation" has been attributed to improvements in institutional quality (see Frankel et al. (2013)).
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correlation of the government expenditure and the real interest rate with respect to output
however, is positive or negative.7 This is in contrast to advanced economies where real
interest rates are observed to be a-cyclical or mildly pro-cyclical (see Agénor et al. (2000),
Neumeyer and Perri (2005), and Male (2010)). In Table 1, we summarize the estimates of the
relative standard deviation and contemporaneous correlations of government expenditures
(G) and real interest rates (R) for 12 EMEs from Male (2010).8 In countries for which data
is available, ve countries have counter-cyclical real interest rates, while six have pro-cyclical
interest rates. Further, while government expenditure is counter-cyclical in ve countries, it
is pro-cyclical in four.
Table 1 : Real interest rates and government expenditures in EMEs fromMale (2010)
Country Sample (G)
(Y )
(R)
(Y )
 (G; Y )  (R; Y )
Chile 1980:1-2004:4 11:3 1:7    0:22
Colombia 1980:1-2004:4 2:2 3:7 0:35 0:27
Hong Kong 1980:1-2004:4 2:5 3:1  0:21 0:33
Hungary 1980:1-2004:4 1:7 2:6  0:63  0:01
Israel 1980:1-2004:4 20:7 8:7    0:02
Korea 1980:1-2004:4 2:4 2:1  0:04  0:36
Mexico 1980:1-2004:4 4:0 8:5  0:11  0:48
Slovak Rep. 1980:1-2004:4 2:3 5:1   0:45
Slovenia 1980:1-2004:4 1:5 11:1 0:27 0:25
South Africa 1980:1-2004:4 1:9 3:9 0:04 0:13
Turkey 1980:1-2004:4 8:3   0:74  
India 1999:2-2010:2 5:53 1:77  0:35 0:38
Drawing on the evidence from Table 1, Table 2 summarizes the stylized facts that are the
focus of the theoretical literature on EME business cycles (Column 2), and the wider EME
evidence in Column 3.
7While Neumeyer and Perri (2005) and Uribe and Yue (2005) state that interest rates are generally
counter-cyclical in EMEs, Male (2010) nds this observation not to be universally true particularly among
EMEs in Africa, Asia, and Eastern Europe.
8 (Z) denotes the standard deviation of variable Z and  (Z; Y ) is the contemporaneous correlation of
variable Z with output, Y . For India, we obtain the moments from Ghate et al. (2013).
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Table 2: Facts based on the wider literature on EME business cycles
Variables Evidence from NP and AG9 Wider evidence from Male10
(C)
(Y )
> 1 > 1
(NX
Y
; Y ) < 0 < 0
(R; Y ) < 0 ? 0
(G; Y ) No Role ? 0
Given Tables 1 and 2; we build a small open economy RBC model which allows us to
understand the causal link between the nature of counter-cyclical / a-cyclical scal policy,
pro-cyclical / counter-cyclical real interest rates, counter-cyclical net exports, and higher
relative consumption volatility. Our is therefore a more general framework to understand
the wider EME evidence on business cycles.
1.1 Description and Main Results
We develop a small open economy (SOE) real business cycle (RBC) model along the lines
of Neumeyer and Perri (2005) with two crucial di¤erences.
First, we extend their framework by incorporating scal policy. We incorporate two
di¤erent roles for scal policy: the government provides public consumption with the private
and public components of consumption substitutable; and, the government lends a portion of
the working capital constraint faced by the rm at a subsidized interest rate. We assume that
the government imposes time invariant distortionary taxes on consumption, labor income and
capital income, and maintains a balanced budget at every time period.
Second, unlike Neumeyer and Perri (2005), where agents have GHH preferences, in our
framework, agents are assumed to have Cobb-Douglas (CD) utility functions. The assump-
tion of CD preferences permits a shock to the real interest rate to have income e¤ects on
labor supply through consumption.
In this paper we show that these added features make the real interest rate less counter-
cyclical or even pro-cyclical at times. Fiscal policy a¤ects the transmission of interest rate
shocks onto the real economy through a standard inter-temporal substitution e¤ect, and a
time varying wedge which we denote as the scal policy wedge. We show that the scal policy
wedge is a more general version of the simple intra-temporal tax wedge that distorts labor
hours in the standard stochastic growth model. Our theoretical contribution is two-fold: rst,
we characterize the scal policy wedge in closed-form under a variety of assumptions on scal
9NP stands for Neumeyer and Perri (2005) and AG stands for Aguiar and Gopinath (2007).
10See Male (2010)
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policy, and show how this a¤ects movements in labor supply adversely; and second, we show
that because the scal policy wedge is time varying and increases with a positive interest rate
shock, the impact of an increase of the wedge on labor supply is higher when there is a higher
weight on government consumption in utility. This happens because of two e¤ects. First,
when an economy is hit with an interest rate shock labor supply falls because of an increase
in the scal policy wedge. The scal policy wedge increases by more when households value
public consumption highly. Second, a higher weight on public consumption in utility induces
a strong standard inter-temporal substitution e¤ect which reduces private consumption and
increases labor supply. The net e¤ect on labor market outcomes of a positive interest rate
shock therefore depends on the relative strength of these two individual e¤ects. In general,
the net e¤ect will be positive (i.e., equilibrium employment and output increase).11
We also show that scal policys second role in our model - to subsidize working capital -
dampens the reduction in labor demand due to a positive interest rate shock in the standard
Neumeyer and Perri (2005) setup. Thus, both labor supply and labor demand channels
make the real interest rate a-cyclical, and under certain cases, pro-cyclical, matching the
qualitative features of the EME data in Table 2.12
1.1.1 Indian Business Cycle
We calibrate our model to India.13 We choose India because India typies the broader EME
business cycle experience listed in Column 3 (Table 2). The key Indian stylized facts are:
higher relative consumption volatility, higher relative investment volatility, counter-cyclical
net exports, counter-cyclical government expenditures, and a pro-cyclical interest rate (see
Ghate et al. (2013), Table 5).14 The counter-cyclicality of government expenditures has
been coupled with pro-cyclical interest rates and counter-cyclical next exports, consistent
with the evidence on other EMEs reported in Table 1 and Table 2. There is no robust
estimate for labor hours on the Indian economy. However, as we will show later, because
equilibrium output depends on labor market outcomes, analyzing changes in equilibrium
output are su¢ cient from the standpoint of determining co-movements. We also believe
that the specication of scal policy in this paper is particularly relevant for India (and
other EMEs). For instance, although there have been major nancial sector reforms, public
11The counter-cyclicality of government spending is also consistent with the theoretical prediction of
government spending in the neo-classical framework where we would expect to see government consumption
move counter-cyclically, if public and private components are substitutes. See Lane (2003).
12Our results are consistent with many papers in the literature which argue that the nal e¤ect of the simple
inter-temporal tax wedge on hours worked depends crucially on whether public consumption is perceived as
highly substitutable by agents (see Prescott, 2002).
13We calibrate our model using Dynare Version 4.3.0.
14These tables have been generated using quarterly data from 1999-Q2 - 2010-Q2.
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sector banks still own 70% of the banking sectors assets in India.15 These banks extend
priority sector lending to certain sectors such as agriculture, exports, infrastructure and
small and medium enterprises (SMEs) at a subsidized lending rate. Government consumption
expenditures, in recent years, has also approximated 12% of GDP in recent years16 suggesting
its role as a plausible channel through which interest rate shocks are propagated in the model.
2 The Model
2.1 The Firms Problem
The economy consists of rms, a government, and households. At any given time t a rep-
resentative rm produces nal output using labor employed at time t and capital carried
forward from time period t  1. However, prior to actual production, the rm needs to pay
a portion  2 [0; 1] of its total wage bill in advance. To meet this working capital constraint,
the rm borrows from the government and from households by issuing debt.17 The rm
issues corporate bonds to households to whom they promise a return of RPt 1 which is a
mark-up over the existing international interest rate Rt 1: Firms can also borrow from the
government at a subsidized interest rate RPt 1(1   s) where 0  s < 1 is the subsidy. We
assume however that only a xed portion, G; of the total rms working capital constraint,
; such that G   can be borrowed from the government at the subsidized rate. The
rest of the working capital constraint (   G  0) has to be covered by issuing bonds in
international capital markets at RPt 1.
The rm hires labor (lt) and uses capital (kt 1) accumulated in time period t   1 to
produce the nal output yt such that
yt = Atk

t 1l
1 
t (1 + )
t(1 ) (1)
= Atk

t 1

(1 + )t lt
1 
; 0 <  < 1
where (1 + )t is labor augmenting technical progress in time period t: We assume that the
production technology, yt; exhibits constant returns to scale (CRS). The rms prots are
given by:
t = yt   wtlt   rtkt 1  
 
RGt 1   1

Gwtlt  
 
RPt 1   1

(   G)wtlt; (2)
15Table no. 3.1, statistical tables relating to banks of India, Handbook of Statistics of the Indian Economy,
2012 (http://www.rbi.org.in/scripts/PublicationsView.aspx?id=14672).
16See the 2013 World Development Indicators: http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NE.CON.GOVT.ZS
17In Neumeyer and Perri (2005), rms cannot borrow from the government.
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The last two terms in (2) denote the interest costs for working capital loans from the gov-
ernment and households, respectively, where RPt 1 is the country specic gross interest rate
at which rms borrow from international capital markets, and RGt 1 is the subsidized gross
interest rate o¤ered by the government to lend Gportion of the rms total working capital
constraint. No-arbitrage implies:
RGt 1 = R
P
t 1(1  s) > 1; 0  s < 1 (3)
Here RGt 1 > 1 since it is the gross interest rate. We can therefore re-write equation (2) as
t = yt   rtkt 1   (1  )wtlt   wtltRPt 1 [   sG] : (4)
The partially subsidized loan provided by the government to cover the rms working capital
constraint therefore e¤ectively creates a wedge [   sG] on the interest payment. Clearly, if
s = 0; we go back to the standard Neumeyer and Perri (2005) model.18
Timing of Events The timing of events and decisions is given in Figure (1). In the
beginning of period t, which we denote as t ; rms borrow, wtlt; to make advance payments
to labor prior to actual production (which occurs at t). Firms then produce output and repay
the loan borrowed at the end of time period (t+), with workers receiving the rest of their
wage bill, (1   )wtlt , at time t+ also: Since the time gap between t  and t; and between
t and t+ is very small, we drop these superscripts and consider the entire period as time
period t:
Figure 1: Timing of Events and Decisions
18As in Neumeyer and Perri (2005), country specic interest rates depend on the international interest
rate and country specic spread component which measures the economys riskiness.
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We transform output yt to its stationary value eyt; as follows19
eyt = yt
(1 + )t
=
Atk

t 1l
1 
t (1 + )
t(1 )
(1 + )t
= At
kt 1
(1 + )t
 l1 t
=
At
(1 + )
ekt 1l1 t :
Hence, equation (4) can be re-written as
et = eyt   rtekt 1
(1 + )
  (1  ) ewtlt   ewtltRPt 1 [   sG] :
2.1.1 Firms Prot Maximizing Conditions
The rms prot maximization yields the following rst order conditions 8t; for labor, lt; and
capital, ekt 1; respectively.
fltg : (1  )eyt
lt
= ewt (1  ) +RPt 1 (   sG) (5)nekt 1o : eytekt 1 = rt(1 + ) :
Without any working capital constraints,  = G = 0; and the standard rst order condition
for labor demand, (1 )eyt
lt
= ewt; obtains. The presence of the working capital constraint there-
fore modies this condition by changing the e¤ective wage payment to, ewt (1  ) +RPt 1 (   sG) :
For given values of  and G; interest rate shocks a¤ect wage payments with a lag since ef-
fective wage payments depend on RPt 1:
2.2 Government
The government collects tax revenue by imposing time invariant distortionary taxes on con-
sumption  c 2 [0; 1], wage income w 2 [0; 1]; and capital income  k 2 [0; 1]. It also receives
interest income from nancing the Gcomponent of a rms working capital constraint.
19For any variable xt, we dene its stationary transformation as ext such that,
ext = xt
(1 + )
t :
All variables in our model grow at the same exogenous rate (1 + ) : All variables are therefore transformed
to their corresponding stationary values except lt; which is assumed to be stationary.
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The interest income is given by, RGt 1Gwtlt. The government allocates Gt of its total rev-
enue towards government consumption. We assume that net of Gt; the government lends
St to rms at time period t at a subsidized interest rate given by (3). The government is
assumed to balance its budget at every time period t such that
TRt +R
G
t 1Gwtlt = Gt + St:
TRt denotes the total tax revenue collected by the government at every time period such
that
TRt =  cct + wwtlt +  krtkt 1: (6)
As discussed above, due to the timing of the rms problem, we have
St = Gwtlt:
Clearly, this implies20
Gt =  cct +

RPt 1(1  s)  1

G + w
	
wtlt +  krtkt 1: (7)
2.3 The Households Problem
The economy is populated by innitely lived households with a mass normalized to 1. Each
representative household consumes and invests a homogenous good and supplies labor and
capital to rms. The representative household has the following expected discounted lifetime
utility
E0
1X
t=0
tU(ct ; lt); (8)
where  2 (0; 1) denotes the households subjective discount factor. We assume that
ct = ct +Gt; (9)
where household consumption, ct is augmented by government consumption, Gt: Following
Barro (1981), Ni (1995), Roche (1996), Ambler and Paquet (1996), and Christiano and
Eichenbaum (1992) the parameter  captures the weight of public consumption in household
20The stationary transformation of equation (7) is:
eGt =  cect + RPt 1(1  s)  1 G + w	 ewtlt + krtekt 11 +  :
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utility, where  > 0. Given our specication in equation (9), ct and Gt are assumed to be
perfect substitutes.21 We assume that agents treat Gt as given. lt denotes hours worked.
We parametrize the utility function, U; in (8) by assuming a Cobb-Douglas (CD) speci-
cation, i.e.,
U(ct ; lt) =

(ct )
(1  lt)(1 )
(1 )
(1  ) ; 0 <  < 1;  > 0:
which is an important point of departure from Neumeyer and Perri (2005). These authors,
instead, assume GHH preferences because their focus was to explain counter-cyclicality of
interest rates in the select EMEs that they consider. Assuming GHH preferences ensures
that labor supply is independent of consumption and therefore interest rates. A positive
shock to the interest rates does not cause any shift in the labor supply while it reduces
demand for labor thereby reducing equilibrium labor. This leads to a reduction in output
which makes real interest rates counter-cyclical with respect to output. We focus on the
Cobb-Douglas (CD) utility function to allow equilibrium labor to increase due to a single
period interest rate shock for some parametric restrictions. The parameter  is the coe¢ cient
of risk aversion and  is the intra-temporal elasticity of substitution of labor supply.
The representative household maximizes expected lifetime discounted utility (8) subject
to
(1 +  c)ct + xt + bt + (bt)  (1  w)wtlt + (1   k)rtkt 1 +RPt 1bt 1: (10)
where bt denotes bond holdings of the household, xt denotes investment, and  c 2 [0; 1] is
the tax on consumption, w 2 [0; 1] is the tax on labor income, and  k 2 [0; 1] is the tax on
capital income. Agents take the competitive factor awards, wt; the wage rate, and rt; the
return to capital as given in deciding optimal choices. For bond holdings, bt; the term (bt)
in (10) is the bond holding cost such that
(bt) =

2
yt

bt
yt

 

b
y
2
: (11)
The term xt in (10) is the level of private investment such that
xt = kt   (1  )kt 1 + (kt; kt 1); (12)
21In an emerging market context, an example of Gt can be public health or public transportation services
whose quality is typically seen as being superior to private alternatives. Higher provision of services elicits
a strong reduction in the private consumption of these services. See Kuehlwein (1998).
11
where (kt; kt 1) is the investment adjustment costs such that
(kt; kt 1) =

2
kt 1

kt
kt 1

  (1 + )
2
: (13)
Households First Order Conditions We obtain the following rst order conditions 8t;
by solving the representative agents competitive equilibrium problem, where e =  (1 + )(1 ) ;
fectg : t(1 +  c) = (ect )(1  lt)(1 )  (ect ) 1(1  lt)(1 ); (14)
and where t is the Lagrangian multiplier. The rst order condition for labor supply is given
by
fltg : t(1  w) ewt = (ect )(1  lt)(1 )  (1  )(ect )(1  lt) : (15)
From (14) and (15) we get
(1  lt) =

1  


1 +  c
1  w
ectewt

: (16)
The rst order condition with respect to bt is given by
nebto : 1 + "ebteyt   by
#
= Et
" e
(1 + )
t+1
t
RPt
#
: (17)
Finally the rst order condition with respect to kt is given by
nekto : 1 +  (1 + )" ektekt 1
!
  1
#
= Et
24et+1
t
8<:
(1 )+(1 k)rt+1
(1+)
+
2
(1 + )
ekt+1ekt 2   1
 9=;
35 : (18)
Competitive Equilibrium A competitive equilibrium of our model is dened as follows.
Denition 1 Given

At and RPt
	1
t=0
, a vector of scal policy parameters f c;  k; w; G; s;g,
and initial conditions ek 1; eb 1; RP 1; a competitive equilibrium is a vector of allocations ofnect;ekt;ebt; lt and eGto1
t=0
and factor prices f ewt and rtg1t=0 such that, for the given sequence of
factor prices, (i)
nekt and lto1
t=0
solves the rms prot maximization problem (4) and (5),
(ii)
nect;ekt;ebt; lto1
t=0
maximizes the utility of the representative agent (8) subject to (1), (10),
(9), (11), (12) and (13), together with ect;ekt > 0, (iii) eGt satises (7), (iv) a no-Ponzi asso-
ciated with the initial conditions k 1 and b 1 holds for the representative agent, and nally,
(v) all markets clear 8t.
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2.4 The steady state
From the rms rst order conditions (5), at the steady state we obtain
y
rk
=
1
(1 + )
(19)
and
(1  )y = wl
h
(1  ) +RP (   sG)
i
: (20)
From equation (16), at steady state, labor supply is given as
(1  l) =

1  


1 +  c
1  w

c+G
w

which implies
l = 1 

1  


1 +  c
1  w

c+G
w

(21)
where c; G; y and w are steady levels of consumption, government consumption, output and
the wage rate respectively.22 From the rst order conditions for the representative agent
with respect to bonds (17), at the steady state, we obtain
R
P
=
(1 + )e (22)
This implies
R
P
=
(1 + )e > (1 + )
since
0 < e < 1:
From the rst order conditions for the representative agent with respect to capital (18), at
the steady state, we obtain the following arbitrage condition between r and R
P
r =
R
P   (1  )
(1   k) : (23)
In sum, the steady state of this economy is given by equation (19), (20), (21), (22) and
(23).23
22See the Appendix for details on the steady state of the economy.
23See Appendix for other steady state equations.
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2.5 The Fiscal Policy Wedge
This section derives the scal policy wedge for the model, and shows how the impact of
interest rate shocks on labor market outcomes is mitigated by the presence of the wedge.
2.5.1 The e¤ect of interest rate shocks on labor supply
Note that from equation (16), and unlike the case with GHH preferences, labor supply
depends on current levels of e¤ective consumption, ect because of the income e¤ect, and ewt.
The following Proposition shows that lSt can be expressed as a function of consumption,
wages and a time varying scal policy wedge, which we denote by,  t > 1.
Proposition 1 Labor supply, lSt , is given by:
lSt = 1 
ectewt

1  


 t (24)
where
 t =

1 +  c
1  w

	t
Dt 1
(25)
and
Dt 1 = 1 + 

1  


1 +  c
1  w

RPt 1(1  s)  1

G + w
	
	t =
"
1 +  c +
 krtekt 1
(1 + )ect + 

RPt 1(1  s)  1

G + w
	 ewtect
#
:
Further, suppose  c > w;  c >

RPt 1(1  s)  1

G; and  > 0:5: This implies that  t > 1:
Proof. See Appendix.
The above proposition derives su¢ cient conditions under which  t > 1: From (25), the
presence of the scal policy wedge reduces labor supply relative to the case  t = 1. Note
also that from (25),  t depends upon the scal policy parameters  k; w;  c; s; G; and :
This implies that the scal policy wedge is not just sensitive to the tax rates but also to the
subsidy given to the rms.
The above proposition formalizes the mechanism through which interest rate shocks a¤ect
labor market outcomes. From equation (24), interest rate shocks a¤ect labor supply through
two channels in time period, t: A positive interest rate shock causes consumption, ect; to
instantaneously fall due to the standard inter-temporal substitution e¤ect (equation (17)).
Figure (2) illustrates the e¤ect of a single period shock to RPt on labor supply.
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[INSERT FIGURE (2)]
As can be seen in Proposition 1, the scal policy wedge,  t; consists of two time varying
variables Dt 1 and 	t: The variable Dt 1 does not change on impact because it depends on
RPt 1; that is, the interest rate that prevailed in time period t  1. The variable 	t however
increases in time period t due to a reduction in ect and an increase in rt (through the no
arbitrage condition): As a result, the scal policy wedge,  t; increases on impact due to a
positive interest rate shock. Also, for a higher value of ; the increase in the scal policy
wedge is higher for a given interest rate shock. We therefore obtain the following Proposition
Proposition 2 For a positive shock to RPt
@ect
@RPt
< 0 =) @l
S
t
@RPt
> 0
Further, a positive interest rate shock always increases the scal policy wedge, i.e., @ t
@RPt
> 0;
with the e¤ect stronger for a higher . An increase in  t therefore dampens the outward
shift of the labor supply:  @lSt@RPt

 t=1
>
 @lSt@RPt

 t>1
> 0:
Figure (3) illustrates how  t dampens the e¤ect of a single period shock to RPt on labor
supply.
[INSERT FIGURE (3)]
Labor supply moves out to LS
00
instead of LS
0
due to an increase in  t. With Cobb-
Douglas preferences, the labor supply moves outward as a result of an interest rate shock
because consumption drops instantaneously. This is the standard inter-temporal substitution
e¤ect, and it is strengthened with a higher value of . This happens because a higher value
of  implies a higher weight on government consumption in utility which allows households
to reduce their private consumption more and push current consumption to the future.
However; because of the simultaneous increase in  t; a rise in  t reduces labor supply because
an increase in the scal policy wedge makes consumption more expensive in terms of leisure.
The net increase in labor supply is therefore determined by the inter-temporal substitution
e¤ect and the scal policy wedge,  t. When  is high, the inter-temporal substitution e¤ect
has a stronger e¤ect on labor supply than the scal policy wedge. This causes a larger
net increase in labor supply in time period, t: When  is small (< 1), the inter-temporal
substitution e¤ect has a smaller e¤ect on labor supply than the scal policy wedge. This
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causes a smaller net increase in labor supply in time period, t: Importantly, in time period,
t; equilibrium labor always increases.
Note that the scal policy wedge,  t; is time varying because government consumption
directly a¤ects the households e¤ective consumption ect . Under certain conditions however,
the scal policy wedge will be constant and greater than 1. This constancy of the wedge
implies interest rate shocks will a¤ect labor supply only through consumption, ect; and not
the scal policy wedge. Remark 1 summarizes these conditions.
Remark 1  t will be a constant under di¤erent specications of scal policy. When there
is no scal policy, i.e.,
 k = w =  c = 0
s = G =  = 0;
)  t =   = 1; 8t:
When eGt does not a¤ect ect or if the government provided a lump-sum income transfer instead
to the representative agent, in which case, the scal policy wedge is the standard intra-
temporal tax wedge, i.e.,
 = 0;
)  t =   =

1 +  c
1  w

; 8t
Under GHH preferences,  t; is given by24
 t =   =

1  w
1 +  c
 1
v 1
8t:
2.5.2 The e¤ect of interest rate shocks on labor demand
From equation (4), we can show that the demand for labor is given by
lDt =
(1  )eytewt (1  ) +RPt 1 (   sG) ;
24In this case, U(ect ; lt) = [ect  lvt ](1 )(1 ) ; and the rst order conditions yields:
1  w
1 +  c
 ewt =  v (lst )v 1 :
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which can be re-written as
lDt =
"
(1  )Atewt (1  ) +RPt 1 (   sG)
# 1
 ekt 1
(1 + )
: (26)
An increase in RPt causes the labor demand curve l
D to shift inwards only in time period
t+ 1; that is,
@lDt+1
@RPt
=   l
D
t+1 (   sG)
 [(1  ) +RPt (   sG)]
: (27)
This is shown in the following gure (4).
[INSERT FIGURE (4)]
The presence of the subsidy parameters G and s however dampens the inward shift of
lDt+1. As shown in gure (5), if the government increases G or s; the reduction in l
D
t+1 is less,
and the new labor demand curve is LD
00
and not LD
0
.
[INSERT FIGURE (5)]
Proposition 3 summarizes the e¤ect of a single period shock RPt on labor demand.
Proposition 3 A positive shock to interest rate RPt lowers labor demand only in time period
t+ 1: However, the presence of G and s; dampens the reduction in lDt+1. That is@lDt+1@RPt

s 6=0;G 6=0
<
@lDt+1@RPt

s=0;G=0
:
Proof. See Appendix.
Therefore from Proposition 2 and Proposition 3 we obtain the impact of a single period
positive interest rate shock on equilibrium labor and output in time period t. This is shown
in Proposition 4
Proposition 4 Equilibrium labor lt increases on impact due to a positive shock to RPt . This
causes output yt to increase on impact, that is,
@eyt
@RPt
> 0:
Fiscal policy dampens the movements in equilibrium labor. This is because an increase in the
scal policy wedge  t dampens the outward movement of lSt and the subsidy parameters, G
and s; dampens the inward movement of lDt+1:
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Proof. Follows directly from Proposition 2 and Proposition 3:
The import of Proposition 4 is that in time period t; on impact, equilibrium output
increases. However, in t + 1; the labor demand schedule moves downwards which implies
that output will rise/fall depending on the magnitude of the scal policy wedge, and the
policy parameters in the labor demand curve. If the scal policy wedge is strong and the
subsidy parameters, (s; G) are small, then a downward movement in labor demand will
unambiguously decrease full employment output.
3 Calibration
In this section, we calibrate the model to Indian data. Based on the quarterly data available
on the Indian macroeconomy documented in Ghate et al. (2013), the stylized facts relevant
for the Indian economy are25, (a) higher relative consumption volatility, (b) counter-cyclical
net exports, (c) counter-cyclical government expenditures, and (d) a pro-cyclical real inter-
est rate. These facts are based on quarterly data available on the Indian macroeconomy
documented in Ghate et al. (2013), for which we seek to replicate qualitatively.
As we noted in the introduction, while the rst two facts are common to a wide variety
of EMEs, there is no robust stylized observation on the correlation between real government
expenditure and output. In some EMEs, government expenditures are counter-cyclical with
respect to output and in others it is pro-cyclical. Also, while Neumeyer and Perri (2005)
and Uribe and Yue (2005) state that interest rates are generally counter-cyclical in EMEs,
Male (2010) nds this observation not to be universally true particularly among EMEs in
Africa, Asia and Eastern Europe. In the small sample of EMEs in Neumeyer and Perri
(2005), however, the interest rate is counter-cyclical, and there is no role for scal policy.
Our theoretical model can therefore be seen as providing a more general model that produces
a range of business cycle outcomes that are consistent with the broader EME experience.
3.1 Parameter Values
We set the exogenous labor augmenting technological progress for India at  = 0:047 as
estimated by Bhattacharya et al. (2013). We x the quarterly capital depreciation rate at
 = 0:025 which approximately matches the annual depreciation rate in India of 10%: We
choose  = 0:4 from Ghate et al. (2012). The capital adjustment cost parameter,  has
been xed at 60. We assume the bond holding cost parameter  = 0:0001 as in Tiryaki
(2012). We arbitrarily x the value of ; the share of consumption in the utility function at
25The sample period is Q2-1999 to Q2-2010
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0:75. We x the value of the discount rate at  = 0:99 and the value of coe¢ cient of risk
aversion parameter at  = 2:3. The choice of ;  and  are such that the calibrated value
of R
P
is approximately consistent with average long run value of the Prime Lending Rates
(PLR) of three major banks in India.26 We x the value of G =  = 1 as in Neumeyer and
Perri (2005):We choose G   according to our choice of . In our baseline calibrations, we
arbitrarily set G = 127; which means that the entire working capital constraint is subsidized.
We arbitrarily choose a value of  > 1.28 We choose s such that
R
G
= R
P
(1  s) > 1:
Given that India has a very narrow income tax base and depends more on generating revenue
from indirect taxation, we allow for a high tax on consumption and a low income tax (see
Poirson (2006)). In particular, the value of  c is xed at 0:12 to match the VAT rate
applicable in India. We x the factor income tax rates low at  k = w = 0:01 which follows
the estimated average e¤ective tax rates in Poirson (2006): We also x  = 5: Table (3)
summarizes our choice of deep parameters in our model.29
26We consider the average nominal PLR of three major banks in India - the State Bank of India SBI,
ICICI bank and IDBI bank. We construct the quarterly data from the daily data available for each
bank in the CEIC database. For the CEIC database visit http://www.ceicdata.com/en/countries/india.
Some of the missing datapoints on the PLR for SBI was obtained using the data pub-
lished by Reuters India. For Reuters India visit http://in.reuters.com/article/2013/06/10/india-plr-
idINL3N0EM1YU20130610?type=companyNews. We then deate the quarterly interest rates using the
quarterly ination using the CPI data. See Table 170, Handbook of Statistics of the Indian Economy, RBI.
http://www.rbi.org.in/scripts/PublicationsView.aspx?id=14528.
27Though we choose G = 1; the subsidy s is very small, which implies the e¤ective amount of subsidized
loan from the government is not very large.
28In our baseline calibrations, we arbitrarily x  = 5: Since the representative agent takes G as given in
every time period,  > 1 is feasible. A high value of  implies that government consumption is very e¢ cient
and the representative agent attaches high weightage to it. As we will show, this assumption is crucial for
making consumption more volatile than output in our model.
29The rest of our endogenous and exogenous variables are derived at the steady state based on these
parameter values.
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Table 3: Summary of Parameter Values
Parameter Name Symbol Value
Coe¢ cient of risk aversion (calibrated)  2:3
Share of consumption in utility function (calibrated)  0:75
Depreciation rate  0:025
Rate of technical progress
(Bhattacharya et al. (2013))
 0:047
Ratio of wage bill to be paid in advance  1
Discount rate (calibrated)  0:99
E¤ective discount rate (calibrated) e (1 + )(1 )
Real interest rate (calibrated) R
P (1+)e
Share of capital in production
(Ghate et al. (2012))
 0:4
Bond holding costs (Tiryaki (2012))  0:0001
Capital adjustment costs  60
Subsidized portion of the advance wage bill ratio G  
Subsidy on working capital loans s 0:1
Tax on consumption (VAT rate in India)  c 0:12
Tax on labor income (Poirson (2006)) w 0:01
Tax on capital income  k = w
Weightage of government consumption in ct  > 1
Steady state TFP A 1
3.2 Estimation of the data generating processes
We calibrate the model using total factor productivity (TFP) shocks and interest rate shocks.
We obtain annual data for total factor productivity for the period 1980-2008 from the Penn
World Tables version 8.0 (2014).30 We use the variable "rtfpna", a TFP index with base
year 2005, as reported in the Tables.31 The aggregate log-TFP data is then de-trended using
a HP-Filter using a standard annual smoothing parameter equal to 100 such that
bAt = A bAt 1 + "tA; (28)
where A = 0:42
with a standard error of regression A = 0:012. bAt is the de-trended log-TFP data.
30See http://www.rug.nl/research/ggdc/data/penn-world-table
31For 2005, rtfpna = 1.
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To estimate the data generating process for real interest rates, we use the annual real
interest rates data published by World Bank for the period 1980 - 2008. We choose annual
data to maintain consistency in the frequency across all data generating processes.32 The
domestic interest rate on bonds is modelled as a mark-up on the world interest rate, i.e.,
RPt = R

tDt (29)
where RPt is the gross domestic real lending rate in India and R

t is the world interest rate
which is assumed to be the US gross real lending rate. Dt is the country spread over Rt .
33
We de-trend the gross real interest rate data using a standard annual smoothing parameter
equal to 100 such that bRPt = bRt + bDt (30)
where a variable bxt is the de-trended value of xt from its steady state x: We then estimate
an AR(1) process on bRt is an AR(1) process to be
bRt = R bRt 1 + "tR (31)
where R = 0:462
with standard error R = 0:004.
As in Neumeyer and Perri (2005), we assume that the de-trended country spread compo-
nent bDt depends on future expected total factor productivity. In other words, with a higher
future expected total factor productivity, the repayment capacity of borrowers increases,
which causes a reduction in the country spread risk. Therefore bDt contains two components
- an idiosyncratic risk component (ut) and second a term that depends upon the expected
future total factor productivity, i.e.,
bDt =  Et bAt+1 + ut (32)
ut is a random shock
 = 0:4425
with a standard error of regression U = 0:006. We nd that the above relation between
32The real interest rate is calculated as the lending rate adjusted for ination using the GDP deator.
See http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/FR.INR.RINR. These lending rates are rates at which short and
medium term nancing needs of the private sector are met. These lending rates are di¤erentiated according
to the credit-worthiness of borrowers.
33Neumeyer and Perri (2005) and Tiryaki assume 91-day US Treasury bill rate. Ghate et. al (2013) also
report the second order moments for India using a 91-day Treasury bill rate.
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country spreads and expected TFP is statistically signicant.34 This means, a higher ex-
pected total factor productivity in time period t + 1 indeed lowers is the country spread in
time period t. We assume that all shocks are uncorrelated.
3.3 Single Period Shocks
There are three shocks in our model TFP shocks
 bAt, world interest rate shocks  bRt,
and shocks to the country spread risk (ut). Since from equation (30)
bRPt = bRt + bDt;
a TFP shock will lower bRPt through a reduction in D:
We will analyze the e¤ect of single period shocks on eyt; ect; ext; eGt; elt; and net exports,fnxt:35 We will see how a single period 10% shock a¤ects the deviations of these variables
from their corresponding steady state values. In particular, for any variable z; we dene
variable lz as the deviation of the variable z from its steady state value of z i.e.,
lz = zt   z:
3.3.1 TFP shock
Figure (6) plots the impulse response functions due to a single period shock in total factor
productivity (A).
[INSERT FIGURE (6)]
A one period positive total factor productivity shock, instantaneously causes output to
increase. As a result, the deviation of output from its corresponding steady state value
(ly) increases. This is because an increase in the rms productivity causes an increase in
labor demand and demand for private capital. An increase in the demand for private capital
34In Neumeyer and Perri (2005), this model is called the induced country risk case. They also estimate
another case, the independent country risk case, where, bDt; is assumed evolve according to an exogenous
process. This exogenous process is assumed to follow an AR(1) process. However, an AR(1) t for bDt in our
model was not statistically signicant given our choice of the interest rate series. We therefore report all our
calibration results only for the induced country risk case. As an alternative exogenous process, we assume
bDt = "tD;
results for which are available on request.
35We have chosen the value of k = w =  = 0:01 for generating the impulse responses in this section.
While the impulse responses are on net exports, our calibrated second order moments are on net export to
output ratio. This is similar to Neumeyer and Perri (2005), Ghate et al. (2013), and Tiryaki (2012).
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causes an increase in private investments (lx). While an increase in the rms demand for
labor causes an increase in equilibrium labor (ll) on impact and raises output, the positive
income e¤ect causes consumption (lc) to also increase in comparison to its steady state value.
Government consumption (lg) also increases on impact rst due to a positive TFP shock.
This is because an increase in output raises total tax revenue. RPt (shown as R in gure
(6)) falls due to a reduction in the country spread risk. This occurs with a lag. Therefore
interest incomes accruing to the government in time period t + 1 falls. This causes a drop
in lg in t + 1; and thereafter, converges very slowly to the steady state from above. This is
because bA is more persistent than bRP , jj < 1; and lc does not converge to the steady state
even after 40 quarters: The savings-investment (S-I) gap (shown as si_gp) falls on impact
because savings decrease and investment (lx) increases. The public revenue-expenditure gap
(shown as tr_gp) increases in time period t+ 1 because
TRt  Gt =  

RGt 1   1

G
	
wtlt: (33)
This is because tr_gp in time period t depends on the interest rates of time period t   1
which falls because of a TFP shock. An instantaneous drop in net exports (ln x) therefore
occurs due to a fall in the savings-investment gap. Net exports thereafter quickly converges
to the corresponding steady state value because the public revenue-expenditure gap increases
in t+ 1:
3.3.2 Interest rate shock
Figure (7) shows the impact of a single period shock to the world interest rate R: The do-
mestic interest rate (R) increases which causes an instantaneous drop in private consumption
(lc) due to the inter-temporal substitution e¤ect.
[INSERT FIGURE (7)]
Therefore, equilibrium labor (ll) increases on impact due to a reduction in (lc). Output
in time period t depends on lt and kt 1. Since kt 1 in time period t is given from time period
t   1, ly increases on impact due to an increase in ll. Government consumption (lg) drops
in time period t before it increases above the steady state level in t + 1: This is because an
initial reduction in tax revenue from lower consumption levels dominates the increase in tax
revenue from the wage and rental income taxation.36 A positive interest rate shock causes
36Clearly, the initial rise or fall in lg depends on the choice of scal policy parameters. As we discussed
above, our choice of  c > w = k also puts higher weightage on the tax on consumption in comparison to
tax on wage and capital income.
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government consumption lg to then jump above the steady state in time period t+1 before
it starts converging to the steady state from levels below zero: A combination of opposite
movements in lc and lg causes ll to nally converge to zero. Investments (lx) falls because
the private rate of return (lr) increases through the no arbitrage condition. An increase
in savings due to postponement of consumption and reduction in investments causes the
savings-investment gap (shown as si_gp) to increase on impact. The government revenue to
expenditure gap denoted by tr_gp (see (33)) falls because labor (ll) increases. An increase
in the savings-investment gap and a reduction in tr_gp therefore makes lnx increase on
impact as shown in FIGURE (7).
The impact of a single period shock to idiosyncratic risk (u) is shown in gure (8).
[INSERT FIGURE (8)]
The intuition for a single period shock to u is identical to a single period shock to the
world interest rate R at time period t: The impulse responses however seem to be converging
to the steady state very quickly since u is random and not persistent.
3.4 Multi-period Shocks
Next, we calibrate our model with multi-period uncorrelated shocks to TFP
 bAt, world
interest rates
 bRt and idiosyncratic shocks to the country spread (but) and compare the
second order moments of our simulated data with the Indian quarterly data from 1999 Q2 to
2010 Q2.37 Table (4) summarizes our calibration results. We calibrate the model in stages to
assess goodness of t. First, we estimate the second order moments of our model when there
is no scal policy in the baseline model. The results from estimating this model are reported
in the column "No Fiscal Policy". In this case, the scal policy wedge,  t =   = 1: Second,
we include only government consumption eGt nanced by factor income taxes. The results
from estimating this model are reported in the column "Only G". Third, we assume that in
addition to eGt the government also subsidizes working capital loans, where RGt = RPt (1  s),
to rms on the fraction, Gwtlt, of their wage payments. We report results obtained by
estimating this model in the column "G and S". The column "G and S (with high )"
reports results for a high value of  = 75: Finally, the column "Actual Data" reports the
actual second order moments of the Indian data from Ghate et al. (2013).
37See table (5) in Ghate et. al (2013) for the Indian data. The simulated series estimated by the model
was generated for 500 time periods and was then hp-ltered with the value of the multiplier chosen to be
1600, a standard value used to hp-lter quarterly data.
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Table 4 : Comparison between the model and the data38
Moments No Fiscal Policy Only G G and S G and S (with high ) Actual Data
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
(C; Y ) 0:6033 0:4586 0:5126 0:5045 0:51
(X;Y ) 0:1330 0:1022 0:1103 0:0247 0:69
(R; Y )  0:0832  0:0458  0:0546 0:0754 0:38
(NX
Y
; Y ) 0:1912 0:2562  0:1505  0:1792  0:15
(G; Y )   0:6882  0:32  0:0229  0:35
(C)=(Y ) 0:3548 0:3236 1:20 1:69 1:31
(X)=(Y ) 10:9 10:11 10:23 7:23 3:43
(R)=(Y ) 0:48 0:439 0:44 0:28 1:77
(NX)=(Y ) 11:13 10:57 10:64 7:82 1:04
(G)=(Y )   0:358 1:55 0:23 5:53
3.4.1 No scal policy
In this case, the scal policy wedge,  t =   = 1: This is because:  k = w =  c = 0; s = 0;
and G =  = 0: The labor demand equation (26) becomes
lDt =
"
(1  )Atewt (1  ) + RPt 1
# 1
 ekt 1
(1 + )
: (34)
Unlike in (26), in (34) the e¤ect of a positive shock to RPt on labor demand is fully transmit-
ted through the labor market by lowering labor demand. The labor supply equation (24),
becomes the standard labor supply equation in the absence of scal policy:
lSt = 1 
ectewt

1  


: (35)
As shown in column 2 in Table 4; we observe that consumption, investment, and the net-
export to output ratio are pro-cyclical, whereas real interest rates are weakly counter-cyclical.
While this model under-estimates the relative volatility of consumption and the real interest
rate, it over-estimates the relative volatility of investment and the net-export to output ratio.
38(Z; Y ) is the correlation coe¢ cient of variable Z with output Y: (Z)=(Y ) is the relative standard
deviation of variable Z with output Y: Also, refer to table (2) for second order moments of the Indian data.
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3.4.2 Government consumption
Suppose that the government imposes factor income taxes and spends it only on government
consumption that a¤ects utility. The government, however, does not subsidize working
capital loans. Under this specication,
 k = w =  > 0;  c > 0
s = G = 0
 > 0:
Labor supply in (24) is now given by
lSt = 1 
ectewt

1  


 
0
t: (36)
The scal policy wedge, in this case,  
0
t; is given by
 
0
t =

1 +  c
1  w

	
0
t
D
0
t 1
such that
D
0
t 1 = 1 + w

1  


1 +  c
1  w

> 1 and
	
0
t =
"
1 +  c +
 krtekt 1
(1 + )ect + w ewtect
#
> 1:
As shown in column 3 government consumption is quite strongly pro-cyclical. This is
expected because government expenditure given by
eGt =  cect ++w ewtlt +  krt ekt 1
(1 + )
:
which is a fraction of private income. Therefore any change in consumption and income
directly a¤ects government consumption. It is, however, estimated to be less volatile than
output which is at odds with the actual data.
In this model real interest rates are even less counter-cyclical compared to the "No Fiscal
Policy" case in column 2, and investment is less pro-cyclical. A positive interest rate shock
does not have a direct e¤ect on the scal policy wedge, although it does a¤ect the wedge,
and therefore lSt ; indirectly through other endogenous variable such as ect; rt; ekt; and ewt: In
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particular, a positive interest rate shock always increases the scal policy wedge, which tends
to o¤set the outward movements in labor supply due to a reduction in consumption. Interest
rates therefore tend to become less counter-cyclical.
The important di¤erence however, is that the relative volatility of consumption, invest-
ments, and net exports have all fallen compared to the model with no scal policy. This
suggests that eGt has a stabilizing e¤ect. Consumption becomes less volatile because on the
one hand households have to pay factor income taxes while on the other, a reduction in
consumption due to taxes are returned to the agents through eGt which is more volatile than
consumption.
Including eGt also makes the net-exports to output ratio more pro-cyclical. We can rewrite
the net exports-to-output ratio as,
nxt =
(st   xt) + (TRt  Gt)
yt
;
where s is savings and x is investments. Since in every time period,
TRt = Gt;
we get
nxt =
st   xt
yt
:
Since investments are weakly pro-cyclical with output, the cyclicality of savings with output
dominates. Therefore the net-exports to output ratio will be pro-cyclical.
3.4.3 Government consumption and subsidy
Now suppose
 k = w =  > 0;  c > 0
s > 0; G > 0
 > 0:
This is our model as discussed in Section 2 in which labor supply is now given by (24) and
labor demand is given by (26). The moments are summarized in column 4 of Table 4: In
contrast to the model with only government consumption, we now get counter-cyclical gov-
ernment consumption, counter-cyclical net-exports to output ratio, pro-cyclical consumption
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and investments, and weakly counter-cyclical real interest rates.39 Our model qualitatively
replicates the standard stylized facts that motivate the theoretical framework of Neumeyer
and Perri (2005) through an alternate but compatible mechanism.
We nd that contemporaneous correlation of consumption, the net exports-to-output ra-
tio, and government expenditure with respect to output are very close to the Indian data.
While private investments are less pro-cyclical as compared to the data (which is due to a
highly over-estimated investment volatility), interest rates continue to be weakly counter-
cyclical. Relative volatility of consumption, investments, net exports, and government ex-
penditures are all closer to the Indian data and higher in the presence of subsidies to the
working capital loans to rms.
Government expenditures are now signicantly counter-cyclical due to high subsidies
given to rms. The net-exports to output ratio, given by
nxt =
(st   xt) + (TRt  Gt)
yt
;
are counter-cyclical because of a falling savings-investment gap and a negative public revenue-
expenditures gap. Finally, strong income e¤ects from TFP on consumption and the damp-
ening e¤ect of subsidies on the labor, and therefore output, increases the relative volatility
of consumption with respect to output.
While the model with all three shocks and both roles for scal policy qualitatively match
the stylized facts of EMEs, we nd so far that the calibrated moments of this variant of the
model (full scal policy) are also closer to the Indian data than columns 2 and 3. However,
while predicted relative consumption volatility is approximately close to the Indian data,
relative volatility of government consumption is under estimated and that of investment and
net exports are over estimated. We also nd that contemporaneous correlations of investment
and real interest rates are much less as compared to the actual Indian data.
3.4.4 Government consumption and subsidy (under high )
In our model, scal policy a¤ects the economy by distorting the labor market equilibrium.
On the one hand, a subsidy from the government a¤ects the labor demand, whereas on the
other, the utility enhancing government, which imposes a time-varying scal policy wedge,
a¤ects labor supply by inuencing not just its inward-outward movements, but also its slope.
As a result, scal policy a¤ects the transmission of the interest rate shocks on the labor
market, and therefore a¤ects the uctuations in other endogenous variables such as output,
39In our section on counter-factuals, we discuss the e¤ect of  and G on the cyclical properties of interest
rates, government expenditure, and the net exports-output ratio.
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consumption, and net exports. In this section, we therefore analyze the e¤ect of changes in
 on some of our calibration results.
In our simulations for arbitrary values of  = f0:5; 5; 75g ; we obtain the following ob-
servations.40 While government expenditures are relatively unimportant in comparison to
private consumption for  < 1; an increase in  makes government consumption more im-
portant for the agent. Hence, an increase in  makes consumption more volatile, as can be
seen in Column 5 of Table 4. The higher volatility causes a reduction in the contemporane-
ous correlation between private consumption and output. In particular, when  < 1; private
consumption is less volatile compared to output, which is not true for our sample of EMEs.
Our model suggests that a higher  generates this higher consumption volatility.
As can be seen from Column 5, for very high values of ; (R; Y ) > 0; i.e., real interest
rates, from being counter-cyclical, become pro-cyclical. As  increases, private consumption
becomes more volatile. As a result, a positive interest rate shock causes a bigger reduction
in current consumption. A big reduction in current consumption dominates the dampening
e¤ect of an increase in   on labor supply. The net e¤ect is that equilibrium labor increases
by more due to a positive interest rate shock. The real interest rate is however only mildly
pro-cyclical because the productivity shock has also exerted a simultaneous contemporaneous
positive income e¤ect.
Government expenditures also become weakly counter-cyclical (with a higher )  as in
Column 5 which therefore makes the net exports-to-output ratio marginally more counter-
cyclical. From equation (7) ; we know that government expenditure is nanced by taxing
consumption, income, and a net interest income from lending to rms. As  increases, with
a positive interest rate shock, on the one hand, an increase in income and an increase in
the interest rate increases revenue generated from wage, capital, and interest incomes. This
makes government expenditures less counter-cyclical with a progression towards becoming
pro-cyclical. On the other hand, a big reduction in consumption due to an interest rate
shock causes a reduction in revenue from taxing consumption. This makes government
expenditures fall for an increase in output, thereby making it counter-cyclical. Since taxing
consumption is a bigger revenue source for the government, the net e¤ect is that increases
in revenue from taxing incomes is dampened by reductions in revenue from consumption.
This makes government expenditures weakly counter-cyclical or almost a-cyclical. Being a
residual, the net-export-to-output ratio becomes marginally more counter-cyclical.
40These results are available from the authors on request.
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4 The Role of Fiscal Policy as an Automatic Stabilizer
Our model outlines how scal policy can play the role of an automatic stabilizer when an
economy is hit with interest rate shock which adversely a¤ects labor market outcomes and
also real output. Since government expenditure in our model is non-discretionary, it adjusts
automatically with other endogenous variables. Table 4 shows how scal policy dampens
overall volatility in the economy, but leads to a trade-o¤. A rise in  results in pro-cyclical
interest rates and lesser relative volatility for X; R; NX; and G; even though these outcomes
obtain at the expense of higher consumption volatility (see Column 5).41 Higher consumption
volatility happens because of a strong inter-temporal substitution e¤ect driven by the private
and public components of consumption beings perfect substitutes and  is high. This makes
private consumptions response to a positive interest rate shock high. A higher  c would also
make private consumptions response to a positive interest rate shock high making interest
rates more pro-cyclical.
Table 4 also identies the intuition behind why government spending volatility goes down.
This happens because as long as  c is su¢ ciently large, a positive interest rate shock reduces
 cect; which also reduces eGt: A reduction in ect leads to an increase in labor supply and output.
Thus eyt increases and eGt falls. A rise in  causes a bigger increase in elt which makes eyt more
volatile. This causes a reduction in the relative volatility of eGt.
As discussed in the previous section, since the impact of the scal policy wedge

@ t
@RPt 1

is
increasing in ; a higher value of  reduces labor supply more when  is higher. However, a
higher  also leads to a larger reduction in private consumption, ect, and this inter-temporal
substitution e¤ect leads to an increase in labor supply which o¤-sets the reduction in labor
supply from the scal policy wedge. The net e¤ect on labor supply is therefore positive.
Therefore the strength of substitutability between, ect, and eGt, captured by  is crucial for
scal policys role as an automatic stabilizer.
5 Conclusion
We build a tractable small open economy RBC model in which scal policy has a role in
making pro-cyclical real interest rates consistent with counter-cyclical net exports and higher
consumption volatility. Our theoretical model contributes to the growing literature on scal
policy in small open economies. In particular, we show that by adding a role for scal policy
in the Neumeyer and Perri (2005) setup, we are able to establish a causal link between
41While we do not assess welfare in the model, Gali (1994) shows that large taxes and large government
expenditures while stabilizing in nature have welfare reducing e¤ects.
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the nature of scal policy (counter-cyclical / a-cyclical), real interest rates (pro-cyclical /
counter-cyclical), counter-cyclical net exports, and higher relative consumption volatility.
Our framework therefore can be seen as a more general framework to understand the e¤ect
of interest rate shocks on the real economy discussed in the empirical business cycle literature.
We then calibrate the model to India to qualitatively match its business cycle properties.
We also discuss the role that scal policy as an automatic stabilizer in the context of our
model.
From a policy standpoint, our model suggests how the adverse e¤ects of interest rate
shocks on labor market outcomes can be mitigated by scal policy. For future work, we
hope to introduce sovereign debt and endogenize country spreads with sovereign default
risks. We also hope to undertake a welfare analysis of various types of scal policy in our
model.
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6 Technical Appendix
Steady state calculations
The following are the set of steady state conditions that will be used in the model
R
P
=
(1 + )e (37)
r =
R  (1  )
(1   k) (38)
From the rms FOC,
y =
rk
(1 + )
(39)
and
(1  )y = wl
h
(1  ) +RP (   sG)
i
: (40)
From (21) we got
(1  l) = (1  )

(1 +  c)
(1  w)
c+G
w
: (41)
This implies
(1  l)
l
=
(1  )

(1 +  c)
(1  w)
c
y
+G
y
wl
y
:
) l = 1
1 + (1 )

(1+c)
(1 w)
c
y
+G
y
wl
y
 :
From the output technology we know
eyt = At
(1 + )
hekt 1i l1 t :
This implies, at steady state,
y =
A
(1 + )
k

l
1 
:
We also know from (39)
y =
rk
(1 + )
:
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This implies
rk
(1 + )
=
A
(1 + )
k

l
1 
) rk
1 
(1 + )
(1 + )
A
= l
1 
) k =

A
r
 1
1 
(1 + ) l: (42)
This implies from (41)
w =
(1  )yh
(1  ) +RP (   sG)
i
l
: (43)
The expressions of k, y, w, l, and r will follow. Once y is known,
b =

b
y

y; (44)
where,

b
y

is a known parameter. From the budget constraint
c
y
=
(1  w)wly
(1 +  c)
+
(1   k) rky
(1 +  c)(1 + )
+
R
P
b
y
(1 +  c)(1 + )
 
k
y
(1 +  c)
+
(1  )k
y
(1 + )(1 +  c)
 
b
y
(1 +  c)
:
(45)
From the government budget constraint
G
y
=

 c
c
y
+
nh
R
P
(1  s)  1
i
G + w
o wl
y
+
 k
(1 + )
rk
y

: (46)
This implies
c
y
+
G
y
=
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y

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+ 
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R
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i
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w
o
+
rk
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+ 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+
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 c)
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"
R
P
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)
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#
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 c)
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
 + 
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)

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This can be further simplied
c
y
+
G
y
=
(1  )h
(1  ) +RP (   sG)
i (1  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R
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w
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+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R
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)
 :
Therefore other parameters are estimated as
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, follows:
Finally for net exports,
gNX t = eyt   ect   ext   eGt
)
gNX teyt = 1  ecteyt   exteyt   eGteyt
) fnxt = 1  ecteyt   exteyt   eGteyt
) nx = 1  c
y
  x
y
  G
y
; clearly follows from above.
Proposition (1)
We know from the agents problem, labor supply is given by
lSt = 1 
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
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ectewt
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This implies
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Now, is
 t > 1?
This is true if
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;
we can be assured that  t surely is greater than 1: We will look for su¢ cient conditions
under which the above inequality holds.
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If we assume that
 c > w;
and 0 <  < 1;
we get
w +
2
c > w +w c:
Hence now the comparison is between  c (1 + ) and (1 +  c)

RPt 1(1  s)  1

G: Dene
x =

RPt 1(1  s)  1

G:
Clearly
0 < x < 1:
So, is
 c (1 + ) > x (1 +  c)?
Or
 c + c > x+  cx?
Clearly, since
0 <  < 1
and 0 < x < 1;
as long as
 c > x;
 > 0:5;
we get
 c (1 + ) > x (1 +  c)
and if
 c > w;
41
we get 
 c + w + c +
2
c
(1 +  c) %t 1

> 1
)  t > 1:
Proposition (3)
In equation (27) we saw that
@lDt+1
@RPt
=   l
D
t+1 (   sG)
 [(1  ) +RPt (   sG)]
:
Hence  1@lDt+1
@RPt
 = 

(1  ) +RPt (   sG)

lDt+1 (   sG)
=
 (1  )
lDt+1 (   sG)
+RPt :
Clearly a higher s or G increases the magnitude of
(1 )
lDt+1( sG)
: This implies
 1@lDt+1
@RPt
 increases
which implies
@lDt+1@RPt  decreases.
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7 Figures
Figure 2: The e¤ect of an increase in RPt on l
S
t
Figure 3: The e¤ect of the wedge  t on lSt
43
Figure 4: The e¤ect of an increase in RPt on l
D
t+1
Figure 5: The e¤ect of a subsidy G and s on lDt+1
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Figure 6: Impact of a single period TFP
 bA shock
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Figure 7: Impact of a single period international interest rate
 bR shock
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Figure 8: Impact of a single period spread
 bD shock
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